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Abstract—This paper describes the architecture of a policy 
regulation system and some of its related concepts dedicated to 
the application domain of computer network security context. 
The actual architecture is based on a methodology identifying the 
main phases addressing the needed reactions that could be 
realized in order to get out of a failure or an attack situation of a 
network.  
Policy management domain has already been largely discussed 
in the scientific literature. In fact, large panoply of works 
focusing on how to develop a policy framework taking into 
account the business goals, the organisational structure, the 
operational rules and the links between low-level policy and high-
level one [13]. Nevertheless, it is notable that policy regulation 
remains an area where less work has been done, more specially 
the policy regulation according to business requirements.  
This paper aims to propose a framework for policy regulation 
that integrates the business layer during the regulation phase.  
 
 
Index Terms—Architecture, Policy, Regulation, Computer 
network security, Reaction. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today telecommunication and information systems are more 
widely spread and mainly heterogeneous. This basically 
involves more complexity through their opening and their 
interconnection. Consequently, this has a dramatic drawback 
regarding threats that could occur on such networks via 
dangerous attacks. These attacks, continuously growing are 
based on all new attacks techniques, which are actually 
exposing operators as well as the end user.  
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The realm of security management of information and 
communication systems is actually facing many challenges, 
very often due to the fact that it is difficult to: 
 
• Establish central or local permanent decision capabilities; 
• Have the necessary level of information;  
• Quickly collect the information, which is critical in case 
of an attack on a critical system node; 
• Launch automated counter measures to quickly block a 
detected attack; 
• Efficiently react against an attack, especially if this needs 
a change on an equipment configuration, which often 
necessitate many checks that have to be performed in 
order to avoid bad side effects (conflict creation, services 
stability, etc). 
 
Thus, it is crucial to elaborate a strategy of reaction after 
detection against these attacks. This is mainly the subject of 
the work presented in this paper dealing with the concepts 
aiming at fulfilling the mission of optimising security and 
protection of communication and information systems. The 
principle is mainly to achieve the following:  
 
• React quickly and efficiently to any simple attack but also 
to any complex and distributed ones. The reaction is 
organised in 2 steps: instantaneous reaction based on 
existing policy to avoided leaving vulnerability in the 
system and differed reaction aiming in adopting the based 
policy to avoided new attack occurrence. 
• Ensure a homogeneous and smart communication system 
configuration, that are commonly considered and the 
main sources of vulnerabilities. 
 
The different phases of an attack and the associated reaction 
processes are shown in Figure 1. This figure is extracted from 
the RED1 project principle [12]. As a partner of this project, 
our main contribution is actually related to the RED 
architecture as well as at the policy management level. Some 
1 RED: REaction after Detection a European CELTIC project 
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of these primary elements of the contributions are presented in 
this paper. These are related to the way to exploit the RED 
architecture in the context of policy management and more 
especially in the perspective of policy regulation based on 
business governance. In [13] the authors presented an 
innovative and new mechanism for adapting the security 
policy of an information system according to the threat it 
receives, and hence its behaviour and the services it offers. 
This mechanism takes into account not only threats, but also 
legal constraints and other objectives of the organization 
operating this information system, taking into account 
multiple security objectives and providing several trade-off 
options between security objectives, performance objectives, 
and other operational constraints. 
Our contributions are widely related to [13] in the sense that it 
uses the context principle of the Or-BAC modelling valid 
during the crisis period (intrusion context). Our approach is to 
adopt the same philosophy than in [13] in terms of regulation 
but at the same time it enhances the business involvement 
during the policy modification mechanism, which lays down 
the foundation of a new approach for the elaboration of 
methodological aspects strengthening the regulation 
perspectives.   
 
 
 
Secondes 
minutes 
Hours 
Local  
reaction 
containment 
Automated counter 
measures (delude, 
isolate, …)  
Final reaction  
(Vulnerability solved, 
configuration  changed,…) 
Nominal 
conditions 
Certified 
configuration 
Global detection 
Of suspicious 
Local 
detection 
of suspicious 
behavior 
Before              attacks             After 
time
 
Management console 
 
 
Figure 1: Different phases of attack and main processes 
II. ARCHITECTURE 
Since the early days of intrusion detection, the question of 
alert handling has been a daunting task for security officers. 
The original proposition of intrusion detection is the creation 
of a trustworthy audit trail that can show and track threats. 
Intrusion prevention has taken over, proposing to automate the 
reaction to alerts provided by intrusion detection devices. We 
are currently at a stage where intrusion-prevention devices, 
network-based or host-based, are capable of blocking 
undesired traffic, reconfiguring firewalls or quarantining 
undesired code.  
 
Unfortunately, this state of the art leaves much to be desired in 
terms of coherent response. First of all, reaction is based on 
immediate detection, and is very close to the actual event or 
audit trail. As a result, the same action from the attacker is 
going to trigger the same local reaction to the perceived threat, 
hence possibly overloading the reaction device or the target 
information system. The location of the response is not 
optimal either, as the detection/prevention device may be deep 
into the network; the threat is therefore carried unchecked 
within the information system whereas it could be stopped 
earlier.   
More fundamentally, the configuration of the response 
happening on the intrusion prevention device is left to an 
operator that may not be aware of the operational constraints 
of the information system or network, but is preoccupied by 
the protection of its (smaller) territory. Therefore, mistakes 
and undesired side effects are often likely to happen, or 
reaction is deactivated because of the fear of side effects. 
 
The need for a more coherent approach to reaction is therefore 
important to progress in the direction of attack resilience and 
obtain more secure information systems. We propose to base 
this approach on policies, and more specifically on security 
policies and the OrBAC formalism. 
 
More pragmatically, RED architecture consists in a regulation 
based upon policies. Indeed, the policy modification is a way 
to adapt the security of a global network. The corporate policy 
is defined once for all, and isn’t modified by the regulation. 
As it’s described on the left of the Figure 2, the corporate 
rules represent an input to the system, and to the regulation 
module. The corporate rules, combined with the new rules 
(issued from the policy’s modification) are mapped into 
technical rules, as described in section IV (Policy Based 
Regulation). The new technical rules are then instantiate on 
the network and on the related objects. It’s in this instantiation 
that the reaction is really realized. Thus, at this point, the 
network reaches a new security status. New observations are 
realized on the network, and if necessary (as described in the 
section IV, Methodology), new business rules are defined. 
Optionally, before introducing these new rules in the system, 
an agreement could be asked to the owner of the corporate 
policy. This agreement can be automatic or not, depending on 
the context, the extend of application, the level of abstraction 
of the policy application’s area, the policy owner agreement. 
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Figure 2 - RED architecture (basic elements) 
 
The Figure 2 represents the main elements of the foreseen 
RED architecture. This takes the business rules as input, the 
policy regulation in the loop, and a new security status as 
output of the system. This is mainly relying on a policy 
adapted to a specific situation (context).  
 
III. POLICY MANAGEMENT 
In the literature, a large number of works has already been 
realized in the context of policy and policy deployment. The 
work around Ponder, a language for specifying management 
and security policies for distributed systems, has defined a 
policy as several rules that govern the choices in the behavior 
of a system. Security policy define which actions are allowed, 
for what, whom, and under which conditions [1, 2]. In [3], 
Travis Beaux et al. makes a survey over policies and classify 
the policies in term of: 
 
• high-level program policies that address security goals, 
security staff and their responsibilities;  
• issue policies that address a single legal or technical 
security issue such as properly handling financial or 
health care information, contingency planning, or remote 
connectivity; and  
• system policies that concern low level technical policies 
that describe how to configure specific systems and 
applications. 
Even if at the beginning, research about policies had largely 
been focused on low-level policy (technical policy), 
researchers have also devoted some attention to the policy’s 
specification [9]. Arosha K. Bandara et al. [4] propose a 
method for refinement of high-level goals into operations that 
could be derived on implementable policies. In [5], Rifaut et 
al. explain the approach of formalizing BASEL II2 and ORM3 
with goal models and the ISO/IEC 15504. They present in 
Figure 3 the idea that low-level policies are issue from higher-
level policy. 
 
 
2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”; BIS; Basel, June 2004. 
3 Operational Risk Management 
 
Figure 3: Policy refinement from high-level policies to low-
level policies 
The above Figure 3 presents a company’s abstraction layer 
structured view from the strategic to the technical one. Policy 
refinement mechanism from the higher to the lower layer is 
strongly done in accordance with the corporate objectives 
down to the technical one. Indicators and strategies are 
omnipresent in the refinement process. 
 
When an attack occurs, it is necessary to change of policy in 
emergency or to take action not allowed by the policy. This 
situation is current for IT employees, but IT managers most of 
the time do not define procedures to inform or to consult the 
business managers. In case of an attack or an unusual 
perturbation in the system, a major constraint in policy 
adaptation is that it’s not allowed to modify low-level policy 
without referring before to the high level policy. Not taking 
care about that constraint may be the source of a bad business 
IT alignment. 
 
The technical policy has to be issued in straight line from 
corporate policy. The structure between policies, or policies’ 
hierarchy, implied that the low-level policy owner is fully 
accountable to the higher policy level owner. This can be 
illustrated by the following example: 
 
A healthcare institute has got a corporate policy to ensure the 
confidentiality of the patient’s records. This corporate policy 
(owned by the board of directors) mentions that only the 
patient’s doctor has access to the patient files. Due to an IT 
incident (i.e. attack or system intrusion), the IT clerk needs the 
right to access these records but the IT policy denied such an 
access. In this case, adding new right to the IT clerk means a 
policy modification (or regulation) in contradiction with the 
corporate policy (or policy consign) and need consequently to 
be approved by the board of director (or by another procedure 
agreed by the same board). 
IV. POLICY BASED REGULATION METHODOLOGY 
In order to reach a modification of the policy, several steps are 
necessary. These steps are identified in specific modules as 
described in the following: 
 
1) Measurement 
First of all, we need to realize some security measures on the 
network’s key elements. These elements could be data, service 
(DNS), critical applications, equipments, etc. All the unrefined 
measures should be gathered in a specific place in order to be 
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processed. This gathering could be done through a distributed 
solution or via a classic client/server application. 
 
2) Detection 
The detection module relies on an application able to parse the 
measured data representing the status of the entire network’s 
security. In parsing the data coming from different elements, 
the application must be able to combine them with the last 
security states, in order to detect predefined failure or 
intrusion patterns if any.  
 
3) Analysis 
Once a pattern found, it is necessary to define which elements 
of the network are involved in (e.g. an actor, realizing an 
action on a (or several) object(s)). Considering these three 
elements, the found pattern and the current state of the 
network’s security the policy’s rule(s) to be added, removed 
or modified could be determined. Furthermore, in this module, 
it is important to take in to account the business policy, in 
order to respect it, and to avoid rules conflict generation. 
 
4) Interpretation 
Despite the analysis module, conflicts in the policy could 
appear. The potential modifications that could be applied to 
the policy must be interpreted. In interpreting a modification, 
it became possible to specify its consequences and thus, the 
possible conflicts between several rules. If a conflict is 
discovered, the application will try to solve it, avoiding a 
compromising configuration of the policy. 
 
5) Alert 
If a modification can be applied without generating any 
conflict and without modifying the policy, it becomes 
necessary to advertise the system (by sending an alert to the 
concerned actors or by logging the modification). If the 
modification concerns high-risk elements, an approval could 
be asked. 
 
6) Reaction 
To modify the policy, a new rule could be added and/or an 
older removed or modified, at the business rules level (not 
specifically and only the technical level). The technical policy 
corresponding to the new business policy will be generated 
and applied to the system. In the same way, the technical 
security could be modified in order to reinforce the network’s 
security. Thus, the entire system becomes dynamic since it is 
mainly creating a looping feedback by adapting the measures 
to the new security status. 
 
 
Figure 4: Methodology of the reaction. 
The Figure 4 above represents the methodology used to 
emerge on a policy’s modification, based on measures realized 
on the technical layer of the targeted infrastructure. 
 
V. THE OR-BAC USE CASE 
We illustrate the concept of policy regulation in the context of 
access control policy, and more precisely based on the Or-
BAC model [6].  
As explain by the author, none of the classical access control 
models such as DAC, MAC, RBAC, TBAC or TMAC [10, 
11], is fully satisfactory to model security policies that are not 
restricted to static permissions but also include contextual 
rules related to permissions, prohibitions, obligations and 
recommendations. In [7], the context in Or-BAC is defined as: 
“A context is viewed as an extra condition that must be 
satisfied to activate a given privilege “. By using the Or-BAC 
model, the context can be associated to an emergency 
situation due to an IT perturbation (attack, intrusion or other). 
This kind of context is named intrusion context [13]. 
 
 
Figure 5: Policy regulation in the Or-BAC modelIn the Figure 
5, we mainly added a layer (the bottom layer) in order to 
illustrate the proposed regulation process of section IV.  
In this Or-BAC uses case, a basic policy (issued from the 
abstract level and validate by the business owner) is running 
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in the company at the concrete layer. When an attack occurs, 
the technical IT people first takes actions to face the problem 
and secondly, initiate a process to modify if necessary the 
basic policy. This policy modification of the basic policy 
needs to be validated or improved by the policy owner before 
being introduced in production, this correspond to the 
agreement bloc of the figure 2The new validated policy 
represents the input for the context element of the Or-BAC 
model at the abstract level.  
According to the above example of section III, this means that 
the new policy may become operational if and only if the 
board of directors has deliver its opinion again the requested 
modification. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the context of this position paper, we have explained the 
objectives of the RED project in term of reaction after 
detection. We proposed to improve the regulation chain of 
policies regulation and adaptation after occurrence of an 
attack on the network. In our proposed solution, we give a 
major importance of the business agreement approval during 
the policy adaptation. 
 
Policy regulation’s automation needs in the first hand the 
existence of a hierarchy between the rules in case of multiple 
choices due to multiple attacks and in second hand an 
automatic method to validate the policy’s modifications. 
Cuppens et al. explain in [8] that contexts (and all the 
concepts of its model like org, role, activity, view…) are 
organized hierarchically. Since that, when a conflict occurs, 
security rules associated with the higher context in the 
hierarchy will override the security rules associated with the 
lower contexts. 
 
The next steps of our achievements will to concentrate more 
in the development and the elaboration of the reaction 
methodology, as well as to experimentally validate the 
automated way of a policy modification by the business or by 
the policy owner as it is illustrated in the actual paper. 
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